For Russia’s Sanctions-busting A7 Payment Service, International Transfers Start With Bags Of Cash At Moscow Markets. At Its Peak, It Processed At Least 58 Metric Tons In A Single Month.

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An International Consortium of Investigative Journalists investigation, published in late October 2026, traced how Russia’s A7 payment network collects rubles in cash at Moscow markets and routes payments abroad. The report says A7’s system uses Promsvyazbank, cryptocurrency intermediaries in Kyrgyzstan and companies in other countries; the full scale and legal consequences of the activity remain unclear.

An investigation by the International Consortium of Investigative Journalists (ICIJ) has traced how Russia’s A7 payment service moves money abroad, beginning with cash collected at Moscow markets and passing through Russian banking, cryptocurrency intermediaries and companies in other countries. The reporting describes a system built to support cross-border transfers after sanctions and Russia’s disconnection from SWIFT disrupted conventional payment routes.

ICIJ said it reviewed internal company documents and spoke with people familiar with the network. The documents describe at least eight market-based cash collection points, which A7 records call “departments.” Brokers accept rubles from vendors, count and pack the money into numbered bags, then send it by van with payment orders to a processing center elsewhere in Moscow. About 50 cashiers work at the center, according to the investigation.

After the cash is recorded, it is delivered to Promsvyazbank (PSB), which places it in a vault and credits A7’s accounts. The report says A7 then uses companies registered abroad. Intermediaries in Kyrgyzstan buy cryptocurrency through Grinex, an exchange that the investigation links to A7. From there, funds move through companies in third countries, often in the Middle East and Southeast Asia, where they are converted into local currencies and sent to recipients.

The reporting identifies Sadovod, a large Moscow wholesale and retail market, as the biggest of several reported collection locations. It says hundreds of metric tons of rubles in cash pass through the network. The supplied report says A7 processed at least 58 metric tons in a single month at its peak, but does not identify that month in the available material.

How A7 Moves Payments Abroad

The investigation offers a detailed account of how a major Russian payment intermediary can connect domestic cash to overseas recipients despite restrictions on conventional bank transfers. It describes a chain involving market brokers, PSB, cryptocurrency and foreign intermediaries, rather than a direct international bank payment.

That matters because the same routes can serve a range of customers, and the earlier Proekt investigation cited in the report found that A7’s client list included at least 25 companies under U.S. and EU sanctions. Five of those companies, Proekt reported, manufacture or supply combat drones used by Russia’s army in Ukraine. These findings raise questions for sanctions enforcement and for financial institutions that may encounter payments later in the chain. The reporting does not establish that every A7 transfer is tied to a sanctioned customer or a military purchase.

A7’s Rise After SWIFT Restrictions

Sanctions on Russian banks and payment systems, and the disconnection of Russian institutions from SWIFT after Russia’s 2022 full-scale invasion of Ukraine, created demand for alternative ways to settle cross-border payments. Proekt reported in spring 2026 that shadow intermediaries had emerged, many with offices in Moscow City. Its reporting described A7 as the largest player in this market.

A7 is owned by Moldovan businessman Ilan Shor, who was convicted of fraud and embezzlement in Moldova, and PSB, a Russian state-owned bank. Shor controls the majority stake, while PSB owns 49%. The report also says the state development corporation VEB.RF provides support to A7. Proekt’s sources estimated that A7 handles about 15% of Russian cross-border transfers; A7 puts its share at 19%. Those figures are attributed estimates, not an independently established market measurement.

““Sadovod is simply a big client base.””

— A source familiar with A7’s market activity, quoted by ICIJ

Gaps in the Payment Trail

The investigation describes routes and procedures based on internal documents and interviews, but the supplied reporting does not give a complete accounting of the total value, destinations or number of transfers handled by A7. It also does not identify the month in which the reported peak of 58 metric tons occurred, or explain how that volume was calculated.

The extent to which individual foreign companies, banks or payment recipients know the Russian origin of funds is not established for every transaction. Nor does the reporting alone determine whether a specific transfer violated a particular country’s sanctions or other laws. Proekt reported allegations about possible involvement by businessman Roman Abramovich, while his representatives denied that he was involved in A7. That allegation remains distinct from ICIJ’s description of the payment mechanics.

Further Scrutiny of A7’s Network

The reporting may prompt closer examination by sanctions authorities, banks and businesses of payments that pass through PSB, Kyrgyzstan-based cryptocurrency intermediaries and third-country companies. The source material does not announce a new enforcement action or specify any official investigation resulting from the publication.

Further reporting or official disclosures would be needed to clarify the network’s current scale, the identities of additional intermediaries and the handling of particular transfers. Readers should distinguish the documented payment process from broader claims about who controls A7 or what every payment ultimately finances.

Key Questions

What is A7?

A7 is a Russian cross-border payment service described by Proekt as the largest player in Russia’s shadow payments market. It is majority-owned by Moldovan businessman Ilan Shor, while state-owned Promsvyazbank holds a 49% stake.

How does the reported payment process work?

According to ICIJ’s review of internal documents, brokers collect rubles at Moscow markets, send the cash to a processing center and then to Promsvyazbank. A7 uses overseas companies and cryptocurrency intermediaries in Kyrgyzstan before funds are routed through companies in other countries to recipients.

Where does A7 reportedly collect cash?

The investigation names Sadovod, a large Moscow wholesale and retail market, as the largest of several reported collection locations. A7 records refer to at least eight collection points as “departments.”

Does the report show that every A7 payment breaks sanctions?

No. The reporting describes the payment network and says Proekt found at least 25 sanctioned companies among A7’s clients. It does not establish that every A7 transfer involves a sanctioned party or constitutes a legal violation.

What is still unknown about the service?

The available reporting does not give a full total for A7’s payment value, identify all recipients or establish the scale of every route. It also does not specify the month associated with the reported peak of 58 metric tons of cash.

Source: rss